The PLAAF has flown such profiles before but during daytime not at night. This package went the furthest out, flying about 700 kilometres in a flight path suggesting maritime strike training, in particular attacking any ships coming to Taiwan’s aid in a time of war. This involved ten J-16 multirole strike fighters (broadly comparable to the US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle and the Royal Australian Air Force Super Hornet) two H-6 long range subsonic bombers and a KJ-500. The flight path data released by Taiwan suggests the KJ-500 was, at times ( example here), positioned tactically, that is with the PLAAF fighters between the KJ-500 and any intercepting Taiwanese fighters.Ī third area of interest is that the most complicated event seemed to be on the night of 1 October. This allows the airborne package to monitor the launch of any intercepting aircraft from Taiwanese airfields and be warned of their approach. Doing them at night is doubly hard.Ĭhina’s KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft ahead of Airshow China 2021 on 24 September 2021 in Zhuhai, China (Chen Xiao/VCG via Getty Images)Ī second area of interest is the inclusion of KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft in some packages.
Packages are hard to do and require extensive, tailored training. Combining fighters, bombers, support aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft and more makes the overall package more effective and more survivable in hostile airspace than single aircraft flying independently. “Package” is another arcane military aviation term and means an integrated air combat force comprising diverse aircraft types operating as a single harmonious and lethal unit. Large package, multi-aircraft type, air operations at night are significantly more difficult than day flights. The night incursions are of notable interest. PLA competence – or not – reflects on the Party. The PLA is after all the Chinese Communist Party’s defence force, not the nation’s: as Mao Zedong’s said, “the party commands the gun”. The Party members at each PLAAF command level would want to ensure all went well with no last-minute glitches. Such care also reflects that the Party lacks confidence in the PLA’s competence. Such timings would also ensure the required number of different types of aircraft were definitely serviceable and available.
#Us air defense zone series#
This would allow the plan to be well-developed and practiced several times before this series of major events. Given these air operations’ timings, planning probably started about six months ago. The PLAAF has a reputation for preferring well-planned, heavily choreographed activities. The Chinese Communist Party’s boisterous Global Times media outlet is helping this.
Concerning timing, the flights seem coordinated with China’s national day (1 October) and its following six days of public holidays, aiming to stoke bellicose nationalist emotions. Moreover, such flights are now not just during the day by also at night, suggesting a major ongoing effort. On 4 October there were 56 aircraft overall, the largest number ever, with the daytime wave very impressive in including 36 fighters, 12 bombers and four supporting aircraft. Usually one to several PLAAF aircraft operate in this area on a daily basis ( an example here) but in the last week this has risen sharply. What makes these air operations different is their scale and their timing. From an aviator viewpoint, PLAAF aircraft seem to be trying to minimise the inconvenience to other airspace users, or overflown civilian populations, by training far out to sea in a relatively clear area of airspace, and generally as far from Taiwanese territory as they can. Taiwan’s summaries reveal most PLAAF sorties are over the ocean in the southwest corner of Taiwan's ADIZ. Taiwan’s ADIZ is particularly expansive in covering a fair slice of both mainland China and its coastal areas, ensuring continual incursions as China’s military and civil aircraft come and go. Just to reassure, the PLAAF’s air operations are in international airspace. Taiwan’s ADIZ is particularly expansive in covering a fair slice of both mainland China and its coastal areas, ensuring continual incursions as China’s military and civil aircraft come and go.
0 kommentar(er)
